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Commentary
More Open Issues Regarding the
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
in the European Union
REUVEN AVI-YONAH* & KIMBERLY CLAUSING**
I. INTRODUCTION
It is an honor to comment on the article by Jack Mintz and Joann
Weiner.' Both of the authors have a deeply knowledgeable back-
ground in this area. The paper that Jack Mintz published (with
Michael Smart) in 2004 on provincial taxation in Canada is one of the
most careful and interesting papers in all of international taxation.2
And Joann Weiner has clearly been studying formulary apportion-
ment for a very long time, from both U.S. and European perspectives.
The article makes some very nice points, and we mention several of
them. The main goal of the article is to relate the basic concepts of
game theory to the negotiations amongst European Union countries
to introduce a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).
It also discusses the nature of the apportionment formula and a few
technical details.
The discussion of the switch-over clause3 is noteworthy, and the au-
thors' attention to this is important, as the switch-over clause is likely
to be a significant feature of the proposed system. The analysis of the
"insurance" feature of country tax revenues under formulary appor-
tionment is also an interesting feature of their article. 4
II. Is A CCCTB PARETO IMPROVING?
The end conclusion of the article is that "it is possible for the EU to
reach a negotiated agreement that is satisfactory to all the players in
* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
** Thormund A. Miller and Walter Mintz Professor of Economics, Reed College.
1 Jack Mintz & Joann Weiner, Some Open Negotiation Issues Involving a Common
Consolidated Tax Base in the European Union, 62 Tax L. Rev. 81 (2008).
2 Jack Mintz & Michael Smart, Income Shifting, Investment, and Tax Competition: The-
ory and Evidence from Provincial Taxation in Canada, 88 J. Pub. Econ. 1149 (2004).
3 Mintz & Weiner, note 1, at 93-96.
4 Id. at 111.
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the 'EU tax cooperation' game .... [A]s this analysis has shown, the
solution that the Commission may propose may lead the member
states to reach a cooperative solution that meets their objectives of
creating a company tax system that makes each player in the game
better off without making any other player worse off."'5
This conclusion is possible, and that would be nice indeed. There is
nothing in the analysis of Mintz and Weiner, alas, that really supports
this finding. On the contrary, much of their analysis stresses substan-
tial ambiguities regarding this conclusion. Most importantly, the arti-
cle needs to clarify the metric by which a Pareto-improvement would
be ascertained. Is it the welfare of the member countries, the revenue
of the member governments, or some third consideration?
There can be little doubt that Ireland and Luxembourg, for exam-
ple, will see their tax revenues and multinational activity substantially
reduced if the EU went to a formulary approach, particularly if such a
system were not optional. Thus, without substantial side-payments, it
is unlikely that a move toward a CCCTB could conceivably be Pareto-
improving for the governments involved. The change may occur
nonetheless, particularly if the decision is taken through the enhanced
cooperation procedure that would allow action to proceed without the
unanimous support of member country governments.
At one point early in the article, the authors note that member
states have suggested that any move toward CCCTB would have to
maintain the existing revenue allocation. 6 Yet clearly this is unlikely,
as Mintz and Weiner note themselves in their discussion of likely reve-
nue effects. 7 For low-tax EU countries, their share of European in-
come is almost always larger than their share of economic activity,
whether measured in terms of payroll, assets, or sales. For high-tax
countries, the reverse is true. Thus, any move toward a formulary ap-
proach would unambiguously raise revenue for countries whose activ-
ity shares are higher than their income shares, and reduce revenue for
countries whose income shares exceed their activity shares. This is
unavoidable.
To make their case, there should be more emphasis on the eco-
nomic pressures that necessitate turning to a CCCTB, in particular the
extreme pressures that are put on separate-accounting-based national
company taxation. While this is mentioned up front in the article, 8
there is little discussion of these problems. Yet they are absolutely
central to the debate. The dramatic increase in income-shifting activ-
5 Id. at 114.
6 Id. at 86.
7 Id. at 112-14.
8 Id. at 84.
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ity, the increased globalization of business activity, the extreme diffi-
culties (verging on technical infeasibility) of enforcing the arm's
length standard, and the large compliance costs placed on multina-
tional businesses all suggest the need for a formulary approach. And
it is precisely these sorts of considerations that may enable consensus
to emerge in favor of a CCCTB, even though some countries are still
likely to lose revenue from this change.
III. THE CHOICE OF FORMULA
A large portion of their subsequent analysis concerns the choice of
apportionment formula. They note problematic aspects of many of
the formula components, 9 and they eventually recommend a novel six-
factor formula that would be based on employees, payroll, tangible
assets, intangible assets, destination-based sales, and origin-based
sales.10 Yet this solution is ultimately unsatisfying. Just because many
of the possible choices of formula weights are problematic, they are
not all equally problematic, and it is implausible that simply including
them all in the formula in equal proportion is the optimal solution.
Further, there is no connection between this conclusion and their pre-
vious game theoretic analysis.
There should be a greater conceptual justification for the formula
choice. Two criteria leap to mind. First, it would make good eco-
nomic sense to include in the formula factors that are relatively insen-
sitive to manipulation or behavioral response. Second, it would be
sensible to include in the formula factors that are easy for tax authori-
ties and firms to measure and verify. Implementing these criteria re-
quires an understanding of both the economic elasticities in question
and the legal realities associated with implementing international tax
rules. Thus, this is an excellent area for collaboration between re-
searchers in economics and law.
In a paper for the Hamilton Project, we argue that using a destina-
tion-based sales single-factor formula may best satisfy these criteria."
First, destination-based sales are difficult for a firm to manipulate,
since multinational firms will always want to serve markets with large
economies and rich customers, independent of their corporate tax
rates. Second, as we argue, attempts at getting around taxation by
using strawmen companies with minimal profits could be avoided by
utilizing a look-through rule. (Such a rule would regard any sales
9 Id. at 102-06.
10 Id. at 106-07.
11 Reuven Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing, A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Appor-
tionment for Corporate Income Taxation, in Path to Prosperity 319 (Jason Furman & Jason
E. Bordoff eds., 2008).
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made by a multinational enterprise (MNE) to an unrelated distributor
as sales made to the final destination if the distributor sells the goods
into the destination without substantially transforming them.) Third,
adopting a sales-based formula might fit well with the ultimate goal of
encouraging a compatible trend toward formulary apportionment for
international taxation by other countries. For example, there is a well-
documented trend among U.S. states to increase the weight on the
sales-factor over time, in part due to concerns about losing firm pay-
roll or assets due to the responsiveness of firms to those formula fac-
tors. By adopting a sales-based formula up front, this dynamic can be
avoided at the international level.
Regardless of what formula is chosen, it is important to avoid in-
cluding within the formula items that can be easily manipulated. For
this reason, including intangible property in the formula is misguided.
Omitting intangible property from the formula simply attributes the
income earned from intangibles to the entire multinational firm,
where it will be taxed based on the other weights in the formula. In-
cluding intangible property in the formula begs firms to manipulate
the source of intangibles, which multinational firms have already
proven themselves very adept at doing.
Also, the authors' original suggestion to include both origin-based
sales and destination-based sales in the formula 12 is puzzling. Destina-
tion-based sales are likely far more difficult to manipulate, given the
fact that the ultimate customers of products are relatively fixed. Fur-
ther, previous experience suggests that implementing a formula utiliz-
ing destination-based sales will prove practical. 13
IV. AN OPTIONAL CCCTB
An interesting feature of the EU proposal for a CCCTB is that it is
optional.1 4 This should lower the revenue received from the change
substantially relative to a nonoptional program, as each firm will sim-
ply choose the system that is more advantageous for them. Thus, the
only firms that would elect CCCTB rather than status quo would do
so either because (1) it lowers their tax payments or (2) it saves them
enough in compliance and administrative costs to justify somewhat
12 Mintz & Weiner, note 1, at 107.
13 For example, existing VATs around the world depend on defining the destination of
sales of goods and services. Determining destination for goods is relatively easy because of
customs enforcement. In fact, many jurisdictions use harmonized rules for customs, VAT,
and income tax collection. Determining destination for services is harder, but countries
have developed significant expertise in it under VAT.
14 CCCTB Working Group, CCCTB: Possible Elements of a Technical Outline,
CCCTBIWP/057, at 6 (July 26, 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/re-
sources/documents/taxation/company-tax/common-tax-base/CCCTBWP057_en.pdf.
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higher tax payments. It is unlikely that (2) would predominate. There
needs to be more analysis of this feature of the proposal.
V. GAME THEORY
In general, the article discusses many of the possible issues that are
related to a CCCTB in Europe, without delving carefully into any of
them. The sections where elements of game theory are described are
not closely related to the subsequent discussion of CCCTB negotia-
tions, and there is almost no direct application of those principles to
the questions at hand.
Even with respect to the governments' negotiation objectives, there
is little in the way of direct statements regarding their nature. At one
point, Mintz and Weiner note that governments may be ultimately
concerned with global efficiency and the welfare of all citizens of the
world. 15 Upon casual inspection, this appears an implausible starting
point for considering the negotiations regarding the CCCTB. Ideally,
the authors should be explicit about the aims of government in their
model.
VI. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Our Hamilton Project paper addressed the possibility of adopting
formulary apportionment on the international level. 16 Mintz and Wei-
ner do not address this issue directly. Nevertheless, if the EU does
adopt CCCTB, it raises interesting issues for the international arena
as well.
The most problematic issue facing formulary apportionment has al-
ways been the risk of double taxation if countries adopt different for-
mulae or if some countries follow a formula and others maintain
separate accounting. In our Hamilton paper we suggested that these
risks can be overcome in some scenarios if the United States were to
adopt formulary apportionment unilaterally.1 7 However, it is clear
that a consensual adoption of a formula would be far superior to a
unilateral move.
For anyone who has followed the formulary debate for some time,
the EU move toward CCCTB is amazing. CCCTB could not move
forward without support from Germany, which traditionally has been
at the forefront of opposition to any departure from the classic arm's
length standard and the traditional transfer pricing methods. CCCTB
also could fail if the United Kingdom were opposed, and the United
15 Mintz & Weiner, note 1, at 85.
16 Avi-Yonah & Clausing, note 11, at 21.
17 Id. at 21-22.
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Kingdom spearheaded the opposition to California's use of world-
wide formulary apportionment in the 1980's and early 1990's.18
Thus, if Mintz and Weiner are correct and the EU does indeed
adopt CCCTB, even as an optional measure, this would seem to open
new possibilities for negotiating an international formula. After all,
EU member states now form the majority of the OECD, and the
OECD is the natural forum for such negotiations.
It is true that applying any formula internationally faces hurdles
that are steeper than applying it within the EU. But we should keep
in mind that multinational enterprises operate on a global basis, and
calculate their income for financial reporting purposes on that basis as
well. If multinationals are sufficiently integrated to operate globally
as a single unit, it should be possible to apply an agreed-upon formula
to their worldwide profit.
One of the major achievements of the Advance Pricing Agreement
Program has been the global trading APAs, which applied a three-
factor formula (not dissimilar from the ones under discussion for
CCCTB) to tax banks operating in Japan, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. All three tax administrations agreed on the
formula, and the result was much simpler and fairer taxation of the
parties involved (ironically, one of them was Barclays Bank, which at
the same time was litigating against formulary apportionment all the
way to the Supreme Court1 9). There was no double taxation and no
double nontaxation.
If CCCTB succeeds, the global trading APA story could be repli-
cated on a much bigger scale. The tax administrations of the OECD
(where 90% of multinationals are headquartered) could get together
and agree on a formula based on the CCCTB formula. This formula
then could be applied to multinationals, perhaps as a default (so that
they could negotiate another formula, as the U.S. states allow).
18 See John Turro, Supreme Court Asks Administration to File Amicus Brief in Barclays
(May 18,1993), 93 TNT 106-3, May 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (stating
the United Kingdom has voiced strong dissent against California's formulary apportion-
ment method).
19 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
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